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كلية الدراسات العليا

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اقرار والتزام بقوانين الجامعة الأردنية وأنظمتها وتعليماتها لطلبة الماجستير

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The Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations in Camp David 2000 A Critical Analysis

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The Israeli - Palestinian Negotiations in Camp David 2 - 2000:

A Critical Analysis

By

Rabia Borgan

Supervisor


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This Thesis was Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master's Degree in Conflict Resolution

Faculty of International Studies

The University of Jordan

July, 2011



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This Thesis (The Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations in Camp David 2-2000: A Critical Analysis) was successfully defended and Approved on Thursday 11/8/2011.

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List of Abbreviations

PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
Camp David 2-2000	The Two weeks negotiation sessions between the Israelis and the Palestinians at Camp David retreat in the US in July 2000.
US	United States
ICBS	Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
DOP	Declaration Of Principles
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
UN	United Nations
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
BATNA	Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement
G8	Group of Eight major economies in the world

THE ISRAELI - PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATIONS IN CAMP DAVID 2 - 2000 :

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

By

Rabia Borgan

Supervisor

Dr. Hasan Al Momani

Abstract

Camp David 2-2000 talks were a two weeks mediation sessions that took place in July 2000 at Camp David Plantation in the US, between the Israelis and the Palestinians that was mediated by the US administration.

The question of this thesis is 'What variables led to the failure of Camp David 2-2000?' and to answer that question, the Contingency approach is used to critically analyze Camp David 2-2000. This methodology approach has yielded many variables to be explored such as the relationship between the disputants, the relative power of the parties, the US mediator and motives, the disputed issues and the timing of the mediations.

Furthermore, when the variables that led to the failure of Camp David 2-2000 have been recognized, the analysis continued to identify the key and the secondary variables that affected the outcome of the mediations.

The Key Variables were the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the involved complicated issues; the relative power of the disputants particularly Barak's lack of

political experience, and the US Mediator and motives which reflects Clinton's ending Presidency term and therefore being time pressured throughout the mediations.

The Secondary Variables were the timing of Camp David 2-2000, the parties' relationship at Camp David 2-2000 and the Israeli offer variable; those variables were associated with the key variables; where the Barak and Clinton variables surfaced the short timing of the pre-process stage which led to poor trust between the disputants. This result has impacted Barak and Arafat's relationship at the negotiations, and affected their conduct and trust in the process, making Barak present his offer verbally and Arafat refuse that offer and not present a counter-offer.

Introduction

Since the eruption of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in 1948, the international community has maintained an active engagement so to bring a comprehensive peaceful settlement to this conflict particularly to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, some of these efforts failed to materialize any tangible results while others produced partial success like the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979.

The 90's of the last century witnessed a turning point in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict when the US president Bush the father had launched his peace initiative in 1991 to end the conflict. This initiative was to start a peace process through negotiations involving Israel and the Palestinians as well as the concerned Arab countries including Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Henceforth, a bilateral negotiation process started between the Palestinians and Israel for the first time in the history of the conflict. Since then US has been considered as a major mediator and sponsor to these peace talks. The Israeli-Palestinian bilateral talks witnessed highs and lows, however; it produced partial results in the form of partial agreements such as Oslo Accords that took place between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the government of Israel in the year 1993. Following that both parties had engaged in a bilateral and direct negotiation with an active involvement of the US through out the rest of the 90's of the last century. These talks went through ups and downs where parties at certain times signed different agreements yet no comprehensive settlement was reached.

As part of its continued efforts, the US in 2000 initiated a peace talks between Palestinians and Israel when the US president proposed to host the two parties for peace talks at Camp

David retreat. At Camp David 2 - 2000, US president, Bill Clinton mediated between Yassir Arafat, Palestinian Authority Chairman and Ehud Barak, Israel prime minister for two weeks. During which parties had exchanged peace proposals particularly from the part of Barak who presented an offer that was considered by the US Administration and Israelis as a generous one, but was refused by Arafat which led to the failure of the talks at Camp David 2 – 2000.

The failure of these talks had generated an intense debate sessions between many scholars, politicians and commentators over what were those variables that led to the failure of these talks and who was to blame; however those scholars and practioners have failed to agree on the key reasons for the failure of Camp David 2 – 2000 talks. Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to tackle the Palestinian – Israeli negotiation at Camp David 2 – 2000 and address the different variables that led to the failure of the peace talks and mainly the key variables.

Assumptions of the Thesis

Different arguments have been made concerning Camp David 2 – 2000 and the reasons for its failure. While these reasons could be valid, they might not hold the same relative importance. This thesis argues that, apart from the complicated nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, various key reasons had led to the failure of these talks. Some of them could be: Arafat’s refusal of the Israeli verbal offer, and not presenting a counter-offer, Ehud Barak’s lack of political experience could be another key reason. Also, Bill Clinton was time pressured throughout the mediation which can be attributed to his ending presidency term. So the question of this thesis is ‘What are the key variables that led to the failure of the talks at Camp David 2-2000?’.

Importance and Significance

The importance of this thesis rises from the significance of Camp David 2 – 2000 and the necessity to recognize the key variables that led to the failure of the peace talks. The negotiation at Camp David 2 – 2000 was considered as one of the most important episodes of peace talks between the Palestinian and Israeli sides since 1991. Its importance emanate from the negative impact it sheds on the subsequent Israeli- Palestinian relations. This thesis will attempt to critically analyze the different variables that affected the negotiation at Camp David 2 – 2000, such as Arafat, Barak and Clinton roles in the peace talks.

The Objectives and Aims

The purpose of the thesis is to analyze the Israeli - Palestinian negotiation at Camp David 2 – 2000, in addition to examining the different variables that impacted the peace talks and led to its failure. Moreover, this thesis aims to investigate whether there were other variables that have not been addressed yet.

Methodology and Conceptual Framework

This thesis will be based on an empirical analysis of the literature dealing with the different variables that explain the Israeli-Palestinian talks at Camp David 2 - 2000 and their outcome. In order to achieve the aims of the thesis it is important to comprehend the details of Palestinian dispute with Israel, as well as their Peace Talks and some aspects of the wider Middle East Peace Processes which started in 1991. Sources for detailed information on these aspects are found in official publications, studies related to Palestinians and Israelis, and in those related to the larger Arab-Israeli conflict including its regional and international dimensions.

Since the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks at Camp David 2 in 2000 were a negotiation process, this study intends to discuss and analyze the themes within an approach derived from negotiation theory capable of encompassing all the aforementioned variables. Practitioners and academics apply a number of approaches when studying negotiation and mediation cases such as the Case Study and Contingency Approach.

Daniel Druckman's book 'Doing Research' talks about the different methodologies; one of them is the Enhanced Case Study Approach. The Enhanced Case Study views the case through the lens of an interpretive framework or particular concepts; this provides a better understanding of the case, in which the case becomes an example of the application of those concepts or framework (Druckman, 2005, P. 167).

This approach could be used to analyze Camp David 2 – 2000 but it has to be modified in order to fit the analysis of Camp David 2 – 2000.

As for the Contingency Approach, it assumes that any conflict consists of three clusters; antecedent, concurrent and consequent, where each cluster has a set of conditions. Also these clusters are co-related and mutually impact each other.

The Palestinian–Israeli negotiation at Camp David 2 – 2000 can easily be molded into the Contingency Approach where using some segments of the contingency approach would fit the thesis' assumptions. Therefore the contingency approach could be used to scrutinize Camp David 2 – 2000 as follows.

The negotiation of Camp David 2 – 2000 is seen as three parts; the first part is the antecedent cluster which contains the pre-process variables that preceded the peace talks of 2000 and impacted it. Such as the mediator's role and his motives for mediating the

conflicting parties, the nature of the conflict and the disputed issues, the parties themselves and their positions', in terms of the leadership, the socioeconomic and the international levels, also the nature of relations between the two parties. In addition to the timing of the mediations and whether the conflict was ripe for conflict resolution.

The second part of Camp David 2 - 2000 is the process and its variables matching the concurrent cluster from the contingency approach. The process variables includes all the details taking place during the actual mediation process, such as the strategy or the tactics applied by the parties and the mediator, the interaction of the parties towards the disputed issues and the different aspects that affected the Peace Talks at Camp David. As for the consequent cluster, it represents the outcome variable that is the failure of the Israeli – Palestinian negotiation at Camp David 2 in 2000.

The Contingency approach provides the researcher an illustrative and comprehensive framework to the three clusters of the negotiation.

A comparison between these two approaches, The Case Study and Contingency Approach, would suggest that the later is the one that takes account of different variables of the negotiation process as well as their interactive effect at different time periods. It treats negotiation as a dynamic process which is not dependent on one determinant. Moreover, it allows the researcher to assume and test propositions which are articulated so as to confirm or disconfirm patterns of relations and consequences which enhance the knowledge of how negotiation functions in the real world. Furthermore, a comparison between the two clusters of variables of the contingency approach and the examined themes of this thesis reveals their similarity. Therefore, the approach to study the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation at Camp David 2 in 2000 and its variables will be the Contingency Framework.

Literature Review

Akram Hanieh who is an editor-in-chief of Al-Ayyam newspaper, an advisor to Chairman Yasser Arafat, and a participant at Camp David 2 - 2000, wrote a seven part series discussing the Camp David 2 – 2000 peace talks. In the first part, Hanieh criticizes the pre-process variables while in the second part he describes the environment of the process and the venue. The third part analyzes the US role and describes the relationship between Yasser Arafat and Bill Clinton. Then it criticizes the US delegation team who were bias to the Israelis ideas and demands. The fourth part states that the Israeli side was not ready for the talks, and then he analyzes the conflicting issues; refugees, borders, land and security, and Jerusalem. The fifth part describes Arafat and his reasons for rejecting the American Israeli offer. As for the sixth part it points out that the talks have ended long before the official end time. Then the seventh part discusses the different issues debated and how the peace talks ended (Haniyah, 2001, P. 75-95).

The analysis of the seven parts suggests that Akram Hanieh's articles are descriptive and bias to the Palestinian side. In his opinion the failure was the result of many variables; the timing of the negotiation, the ripeness of the conflict, the nature of conflict and disputed issues, the mistrust between the two sides and the US mediator as well.

"Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors" is an article by Hussein Agha and Robert Malley that was published in the New York Book Review, debated the different reasons for the failure. They presented seven reasons for the failure; none of them blamed Arafat for the breakdown. Instead they discussed the Israeli offer, the US role as a mediator, the timing of the peace talks, and the disputed issues of the conflict, in addition to other reasons (Agha and Malley, 2001, P.10-24).

Sara Roy discusses Camp David 2 -2000's negotiated issues in depth , and debates Ehud Barak's offer, which in her point of view was neither generous nor a compromise. Roy concludes in her paper "Why Peace Failed? An Oslo Autopsy" by stating that even if there was an agreement in Camp David 2 – 2000 it would have failed because Israel's control over Palestinian life would have remained and the occupation would have remained structurally intact. These two reasons in her opinion were the key factor for the peace talk's failure (Roy, 2002, P. 8-16).

On the other hand, Dennis Ross blamed Arafat for the failure of Camp David 2 – 2000 peace talks in his book (Ross, 2004, P. 208). The former US President, Bill Clinton wrote "My Life", this book mentioned that Arafat was to blame for the failure of the peace talks at Camp David 2 – 2000. He wrote , Arafat once told him "You are a great man" and his response was "I am not a great man. I am a failure, and you made me one." (Clinton, 2004, P. 944).

As for Clayton Swisher, the Director of Programs at the Middle East Institute, he wrote about the causes for the breakdown of the Camp David 2 – 2000. Swisher concluded that the Israelis and the Americans were at least as guilty as the Palestinians for the collapse (Swisher, 2004, P.335- 408).

Marwan Kanafani, Yasser Arafat's advisor and spokesperson, wrote in his book 'Sanawat Al Amal' that Camp David 2 – 2000 failed mainly due to the disputed issues and the nature of the conflict (Kanafani, 2007, P. 419- 434).

According to the authors of 'The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy', Arafat was not to blame for the failure of the peace talks at Camp David. Furthermore, the authors debated

that the Israeli offer was dissatisfying to the Palestinians and their basic demands and should not be agreed on for different reasons (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, P. 103-105).

Norman Finkelstein is an American political scientist and author who published an article in the winter 2007 issue of Journal of Palestine Studies. The article concluded that, the perspective of Palestinians' and Israelis' respective rights under international law, all the concessions at Camp David 2 - 2000 came from the Palestinian side, none from the Israeli side." This translates into the lack of cooperation from the Israeli side (Finkelstein, 2007, P. 39-53).

Another well-known author is Avi Shlaim who analyzed the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process as a whole including Camp David 2 – 2000. In his book 'Israel and Palestine', he concludes that the summit failed due to "The Israeli insistence that their package was a final offer that ends the conflict with the Palestinians formally renouncing any further claim against the State of Israel" (Shlaim, 2009, P. 206). Also Arafat's rejection of many of the proposals put to him without putting forward any counter-proposals of his own was another reason. On the other hand, Shlaim argues that Barak was courageous, crossed many red lines on the disputed issues and broke a taboo by agreeing to the partition of the city of Jerusalem (Shlaim, 2009, P. 273).

The analysis of the aforementioned literature suggests a clear disagreement between scholars and practioners over determining the primary variables that led to the failure of the negotiation at Camp David 2 – 2000. Some practioners and scholars, such as Dennis Ross, concluded that Arafat was the key reason for the failure of the peace talks, while other scholars such as Norman Finkelstein, believed that the key variable that contributed to the failure of Camp David 2 – 2000 was the Israeli conduct and offer at the negotiation.

However, some other scholars and practioners emphasized a whole set of variables, that contains the Palestinian, Israeli and also the American roles, which impacted the peace talk. Therefore, investigating whether peace talks had failed as a result of single variable, cluster of variables or another hidden variables that have not been addressed before would be an additional task of this thesis.

Structure of the Thesis

Abstract

Introduction

A quick overlook on the Israeli-Arab conflict was the path to debate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and one of its major negotiation sessions; Camp David 2-2000 Talks. This introduction have paved the way for the thesis to initiate the critical analysis of Camp David 2-2000 talks.

Chapter One: Israeli–Palestinian Peace Talks prior to Camp David 2–2000.

Many pre-process variables prior to 2000 are assessed in this chapter; the relative power of the parties, the positions of the two sides, the US mediator and its motives, the relationship between the disputants, the nature of the conflict and the timing of the negotiations.

The above-mentioned variables have been assessed in order to recognize the pre-process variables which have led to the failure of Camp David 2-2000.

Chapter Two: Israeli–Palestinian Peace Talks at Camp David 2–2000.

In this chapter different process variables have been analyzed to rationalize the failure of Camp David 2-2000. Those variables materialized at Camp David 2 – 2000 talks, and have overlapped with the pre-process variables. In addition to that, those process variables co-related to intensify their effect on the outcome of the negotiation at Camp David 2-2000.

The variables that have been examined are: the US invitation, the delegations and their relationship, the Israeli and Palestinian motives, strategies and Best Alternative To a

Negotiated Agreement (BATNA's), in addition to the negotiations and the Israeli offer. Furthermore, the US mediator and its conduct during the mediations was assessed.

Conclusion

This chapter deals with the failure of Camp David 2-2000 talks and the reasons for it. The previously analyzed variables which affected the outcome negatively were identified and categorized into key and secondary variables.

Chapter One

1. The Israeli–Palestinian Peace Talks Prior to Camp David 2–2000

This chapter deals with the pre-negotiation variables that affected the outcome of Camp David 2 – 2000, and which covers; The Palestinian and Israeli positions, Disputants' relative power and relationship, the US role and motives, the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the timing of the negotiation. Each variable will be addressed extensively in this chapter in order to highlight the pre-process stage and comprehend the impact it exerted on the outcome of Camp David 2 - 2000. However, since every variable may interacts with the other, their analysis may overlap as well.

1.1 Israel – Palestinian's Relative Power Prior to 2000

Many scholars gave different point of views towards power; Thomas Hobbes emphasized that the human beings use all their means in order to achieve their desire (Hobbes, 1985, P.29). While Niccolò Machiavelli stressed that the head of state or leader should protect his state and belongings (Machiavelli, 2005, P. 20), and Karl Marx debated that every class struggle is a political struggle (Marx, 1848, P.39).

The importance of power is manifested in all conflicts which are basically power struggle. Each party wants to fulfill its desire using its relative power. In the Palestinian - Israeli conflict, the centrality of the relative power of the two parties in addition to the mediator's power have impacted the actions taken throughout the conflict and the progress made during the Peace Process. Accordingly, it is imperative to realize the relative power of the

Israelis and Palestinians, in order to analyze the negotiation at Camp David 2 – 2000 in a comprehensive manner.

The relative power of the parties are dictated by the elements of national power; that include; geography, population, military and ability, technological advancements, political regime, economics, quality of the people and citizens, diplomacy, status among region, leadership and its skills, and etc…

Israel's elements of national power are many; one of the main elements is geography. Israeli geography is diverse, consist of the Negev desert in the south and the mountain ranges of the Galilee in the north beside the Israeli Coastal Plain on the shores of the Mediterranean. Although this diversity is considered a positive aspect of power, yet the limited size of territory and the location where Israel is situated in the Middle-East and Arab countries can be considered as unfriendly towards Israel. This rationale stem from the Arabs' mental-set which became one of anxiety and distrust towards Israel, since it occupied all of the Palestinian land, the Golan Heights of Syria, Sina'a of Egypt, and Southern parts of Lebanon. Furthermore, acknowledging that the territory was one of the disputed issues has in general made geography a negative element of national power for Israel.

Another main element of power is the population. Israel's population, according to Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) at the end of the year 2000 is 6,369,300 censuses. This number is considered low in comparison to the population of Palestinian in the occupied territory and the Diaspora this in addition to the consideration that should be given to the population of the Arab countries. The population exerts a negative element of national power to the Israel.

One of the most important elements of national power is the military power. Israel's military establishment is called the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) which consists of the Israeli Army, Israeli Air Force and Israeli Navy (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs brochure, 2003). The Israeli government does not disclose information on the overall size of the IDF, or the identity, location, and strength of units. However, many resources have pointed out that the IDF is one of the most powerful military forces in the world. It has been reported that the IDF budget for the year 2000 goes as far as $15 billion (Seitz, 30th January, 2001, P. 64).

Moreover, the Israel Defense Forces have been involved in several major wars and border conflicts in its short history, making it one of the most battle-trained armed forces in the world (Global Security, 2000, P. 4).

Another point to be addressed is the nuclear weapons of Israel, where it is widely believed that Israel possess nuclear weapons, particularly when Israel has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and maintains a policy of deliberate ambiguity toward its nuclear capabilities (ElBaradei, 2004, P.33).

The Israeli military power is considered one of the most powerful elements of the Israeli national power. Furthermore, the military power is being supported by the US aids (Migdalovitz, 2007, P.51), which has provided total economic and military funding of over $100 billion since 1962 under the Foreign Assistance Act (Mark, 26th April, 2005, P. 15).

According to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt's book 'The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy', "Israel is the only recipient of U.S economic aid that does not have to account for how its spent" (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, P.28). The U.S and Israel has a

very strong relationship, where the U.S considers Israel as the primary ally in the Middle East.

As for diplomacy and foreign relationships, Israel has good foreign relations with many countries particularly the U.S. The relations with European countries differs from one to another; Germany has good relations with Israel while France relationship with Israel is turbulent. This national power is generally considered positive acknowledging the U.S as the sole superpower in the world.

Israel status among the region is a critical and considered a negative element of national power. The regional support to Israel is low due to that Israel occupied the Palestinian land and fought many wars with its neighboring countries. Turkey might be one of the few countries supporting Israel in the region.

The political regime plays also an important role in strengthening the national powers. The Israeli political regime, is considered democratic with parliamentary system and universal suffrage. Ever since the creation of Israel in the year 1948; different parties have been established but only registered parties are allowed to participate at the elections. Those parties are important for the process of democracy and political strategy in general. The President of Israel is the head of state, but his duties are limited and largely ceremonial (Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). A Parliament Member supported by a majority in parliament becomes the Prime Minister, usually the chairman of the largest party. The Prime Minister is the head of government and head of the Cabinet. Israel is governed by a 120-member parliament, known as the Knesset. Membership of the Knesset is based on

proportional representation of political parties, with a one percent electoral threshold[1], which commonly results in coalition governments (The Knesset, 2009).

The Israeli political spectrum is highly fragmented, particularly with small parties exercising disproportionate power due to the low vote threshold for their entry into the parliament and the need for their numbers to form coalition governments.

Parliamentary elections are scheduled every four years, but unstable coalitions or a no-confidence vote by the Knesset often dissolves governments earlier (Migdalovitz, 2007, P. 5). The peace process, the role of religion in the state, and political scandals have caused coalitions to break apart or produced early elections. It is worth stating that the main political parties that have always managed to win the elections are the Likud and the Labor parties.

Israel democratic regime in general is considered a positive element that strengthen their national power status.

Another element that has to be addressed is the leadership and it’s skills; Barak, who was the Prime Minister during Camp David 2 – 2000, lacked the political experience; In July 1995 Barak was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs by Yitzhak Rabin. And when Shimon Peres formed a new government following Rabin's assassination, Barak was made Minister of Foreign Affairs from the year 1995 to 1996. But Prior to Barak’s undersized political career, he served as an officer in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) where he was

[1] The electorial threshold changed into 2% after the year 2006.

made the most decorated soldier in Israeli history (Shlaim, 2009, P. 204). Later on, he was appointed Chief of General Staff in 1991, serving until 1995.

From the year 1999 till 2001, Barak served as a Prime Minister and from the very beginning he was keen on moving on with the Peace Process. However, in spite of him holding high ranking governmental and military positions his lack of political experience has exerted a negative element of national power.

After going through many elements of national power for Israel, it is clear that Israel is a powerful state.

On the other hand The Palestinian's elements of national power are few. Geography of the Palestinian Territories comprised only from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Palestinian Territories are basically two fragmented lands (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) that are not connected. Also those Palestinian Territories are mostly surrounded by Israel.[2] These facts exerts a negative and weak element of national power.

As for the population, the Palestinian Population at the territories was 3 million and 224,504 census in the year 2000 according to Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) estimations which shed a light on the population density and a weakening point to this national power element. Considering the population density, the area allotted to the Palestinians is disproportional; small in size, compared to the population living in it.

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[2] Apart from Egypt's borders with Gaza Strip, and undefined region that connects the West Bank with the Jordan Valley.

As for the economy of the Palestinians, according to the United Nations Statistics Division, the GDP in the year 2000 was $4,195 million (UN World Statistics pocket book, 2000). The West Bank and Gaza economies have become heavily reliant on foreign aid, U.S aid stood at $240 million in the year 2000. Foreign aid provides essential services for nearly half of the Palestinian people, and allows the Palestinian National Authority to operate and pay its estimated 140,000 employees (Avis and Avis, 2010, P. 8). Although these aids strengthen the national power of the Palestinian yet this is un-comparable to the vast amount of aids received by Israel from the United States of America.

The Palestinian political regime is semi-presidential parliamentary democracy. Since 1994, the autonomous Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has exercised various degrees of control in large parts of the territories, as a result of the Declaration of Principles contained in the Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords describes the relationship between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the PNA by stating that, "Palestine may best be described as a transitional association between the PNA and the PLO." It goes on to explain that this transitional association accords the PNA responsibility for local government and the PLO responsibility for representation of the Palestinian people in the international arena, while prohibiting it from concluding international agreements that affect the status of the occupied territories. This situation is said to be accepted by the Palestinian population insofar as it is viewed as a temporary arrangement (Dajani, 1999, P. 121).

The Palestinian people, including the Palestinian Diaspora, have been represented before the international community by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since its establishment in 1964. Furthermore, The Palestine Liberation Organization has enjoyed

status as a non-member observer at the United Nations since 1974, and continues to represent the Palestinians there (Sayigh, 1997, P. 354). The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) president, Yasser Arafat, first started as a Chairman of the PLO, who negotiated the Israelis at Oslo and signed the Declaration of Principles (DOP), in addition to, engaging the role of leader for the major political Party Fateh (Kanafani, 2007, P.217).

The Declaration of Principles (DOP) provided the creation of a Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The Palestinian Authority have responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control. Moreover, the PNA is an interim administrative body responsible for governance in population Palestinian centers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip until final status negotiations are concluded (Roy, 2002, P. 10).

The politics of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) take place within the framework of a semi-presidential multi-party republic, with the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), an executive President, and a Prime Minister leading a Cabinet (Mishal, Kuperman, and Boas, 2001, P.113). According to the Palestinian Basic Law which was signed by Arafat, the current structure of the PNA is based on three separate branches of power: executive, legislative, and judiciary. The PNA was created by, is ultimately accountable to, and has historically been associated with PLO (Sayigh, 1989, P. 252).

The PLC is an elected body of 132 representatives, and must approve all government cabinet positions proposed by the Prime Minister, must also confirm the Prime Minister himself upon nomination by the President. The Judiciary Branch has yet to be properly formalized. The President of the PNA is directly elected by the people, and the holder of this position is also considered to be the commander-in chief of the armed forces (Hilal, 1993, P. 47). In an amendment to the Basic Law approved in 2003, the president appoints

the Prime minister who is also chief of the national security services. The prime minister chooses a cabinet of ministers and runs the government, reporting directly to the president (Rubenberg, 1994, P.94).

The temporary status of the political regime has influenced the national power of the Palestinian negatively in comparison to the Israeli Status.

The next element of national power to be discussed is the leadership. The Chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, has been the voice of the Palestinian people since 1988. Arafat represented almost all the Palestinians from different fractions (Kanafani, 2007, P.302).

Arafat negotiated and signed Oslo Accords and received a Nobel Prize for peace in 1994 for his effort to resolve the Palestinian - Israeli Conflict.[3] Yasser Arafat was elected as President of PNA in 1996 elections.

The PNA president was responsible for negotiating the Israeli side and signed the Hebron Protocol in 1997 and Wye River Memorandum in 1998.

According to Marwan Al Knafani, Arafat's spokesperson, Yasser Arafat was an expert in using written agreements to setup a new reality, utilizing all circumstances to improve the Palestinian negotiating stand, and in taking advantage of the presenting opportunities but Israel's high level of power impacted the negotiation greatly in a way that let the Israelis lay down their will and conditions (Kanafani, 2007, P. 359).

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[3] The Nobel Prize was offered to Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin and Shamoun Perez for their collective work and effort to resolve the conflict.

After going through many elements of national power for the Palestinians it is understood that the Palestinian Territories is not as powerful as Israel; in fact it is considered a weak state due to many unstable and fragile elements.

The imbalance of power although debatable, but suggests that the powerful state is more dominant in the negotiations and that the weak state would redefine its goals according to the powerful and stronger state.

The skills of the negotiators is another element of national power but due to its importance to the Peace Process and particularly Camp David 2 – 2000, it has been analyzed separately hereunder and extensively throughout the chapters for better understanding.

The skills of the negotiators can create difference in the negotiation process, particularly when those skills bridge the gap between the parties and build trust among them (Moore, 1996, P. 161). Those skills are: communication, Linguistic, active listening and framing and reframing.

The communication skills are reflected through having direct or indirect communication during the negotiations.

As for the Linguistic skills it means speaking more than one language; the Israelis and the Palestinians both are bilingual, speaking English. This created good impression of the delegations and made good personal acquaintances between the delegations. Another aspect of this skill is: understanding the cultural background of the opponent and the psychological aspect of the opponent’s behavior; this understanding creates channels to exchange messages.

The active listening skill is administered through deeply listening to the other side and giving feedback after analyzing his talk and ideas. This skill allows the negotiating parties to control their emotions. The framing and reframing is the process of changing how people conceptualize their attitude or interests towards the conflict. Making the transition from competitive approach to cooperative approach is one way to use the framing and reframing skill.

1.2 The Israeli and Palestinian Positions Prior to 2000

Ronald Fisher, Morton Deutsch and Ayres have stressed the importance of the peace orientation of the disputing parties and its affect on the outcome of the negotiation (Fisher, 1989, P. 445) (Deutsch, 1991, P. 30) (Ayres, 1997, P. 445). Moreover, it has been noticed that acquiring peaceful orientation towards a conflict is usually not seen at a protracted conflict, as in the case of the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. However, the Palestinian – Israeli conflict does not fit in that frame, since many factors contributed to the change towards peaceful orientation and the mentality of the PLO chairman Yasser Arafat (Kanafani, 2007, P. 217- 219). Those factors included the collapsing of the USSR, and the emergence of the US as the new sole superpower in the world. In addition to that, the stability and the success of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, given that Egypt was a regional power and most Arab countries idolized Egypt.

The year 1988 witnessed a turning point as far as the PLO is concerned due to many justifications; The Palestinian National Council (PNC), the parliament-in-exile of the PLO proclaimed the establishment of the State of Palestine, diplomatically recognized by many of countries. And Yasser Arafat, PLO chairman, has become known as the Palestinian

people representative in the eye of the international community since the Arab League Summit at Algeria and Al Rabat Summit in 1974. Therefore, Jordan verified the disengagement between the West Bank and Jordan. Thus, the PLO has become known as the only Palestinian People representative (Sayigh, 1989, P. 255).

At the Arab League Summit at Algeria in 1988, Yasser Arafat stressed on the Arabs support for the first Palestinian Intifada which was taking place at the time (Kanafani, 2007, P. 220).

Shortly after, Yasser Arafat was convinced that the PLO's status should not stay as a terrorist organization before the sole superpower, the USA (Kanafani, 2007, P. 218).

On 12th December 1988, Yasser Arafat took action at Geneva UN conference; the PLO announced that it had accepted UN resolution 242 and 338, recognized Israel right to exist and rejected violence and terrorism stating that the PLO and all the Palestinian people were struggling against the occupation for their right to liberation and independence as approved in the UN resolutions.

The US administration in return recognized the PLO and lifted the terrorist status of the PLO, in addition to opening a dialog between the US and the PLO (Kanafani, 2007, P. 224).

Many Palestinian fractions such as Hamas and Jihad did not approve on the announcement made by the PLO in Geneva, and neither did other Arab fractions that were considered terrorist groups.

The US and the PLO dialog continued for many months but had been suspended on the 20th June 1990 for different reasons, mainly due to the distrust of the US administration towards the PLO's policy of rejecting violence and terrorism.

Barry Rubin, the writer of 'Misperceptions and Perfect Understanding: The United States and the PLO' claimed that the US administration could not handle the May 30th, 1990 attack on Israel's coast by a PLO member group particularly when the PLO refused to criticize or condemn the act. It is worth stating that the PLO member who was responsible for that attack in addition to the well-known hijacking of Achillo Lauro ship in 1985, was Abu Abbas who is a PLO member group (Rubin, 1997, P. 33-34).

Few months later, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the Second Gulf War started. The PLO had good relations with Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein, so when The US forces interfered in the war against the Iraqi army, many criticized the US for helping Kuwait and the oil producing countries instantly to protect their interests while neglecting the PLO and the Israeli - Palestinian conflict (Shlaim, 2009, P. 147).

Consequently, President Bush initiated a peace process to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, Madrid conference was the first step.

The conference, which was held in Madrid for symbolic purposes, took place in Oct. 1991. The Palestinian delegation was under the Jordanian umbrella given that Israel did not recognize the PLO as the Palestinian People representative. After the conference Israel was pushed to negotiate with the Palestinians at the Washington talks. During the talks, a secret communication channel with the PLO was being opened in Oslo, Norway. Many secret meetings were being held which resulted lastly in signing Oslo Accords.

Oslo Accords was an agreement that was signed by Israel and the PLO, recognizing each other.

Recognizing the PLO after considering them a terrorist group is certainly a shift of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, which stem from the Labor Party winning the 1992 Israeli elections. This Labor Party victory ended a decade and a half of the Likud hegemony. The difference of ideology between the two prominent Israeli parties towards the Palestinians and the peace process as a whole dictates the progress in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

According to the Labor Party's platform which was modified in 1996, the Labor Party is a center-left party that believes in the peace talks and the right for the Palestinians to have their own state, in addition to applying the notion 'Land for Peace' in their actions (Bronner, 26th April, 1996) (Shlaim, 2009, P. 171).

On the other hand, the Likud Party which is a right wing party, does not accept giving the Palestinians their own country and refuse the notion 'Land for Peace'; Furthermore, The 'Peace & Security' chapter of the 1999 Likud Party platform "flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan river." The chapter continued: "The Palestinians can run their lives freely in the framework of self-rule, but not as an independent and sovereign state" (The Likud Party Platform, 1996, Chapter one).

Those statements mentioned in the parties' platform may not be accurate, but it has been noticed that the Labor Party is more flexible and willing to negotiate with the Palestinians, than the Likud Party is.

When Labor's prime minister Rabin was assassinated in 1995, the Likud Party won the following elections headed by Binyamin Netanyahu. Thus, stalling the peace process and

arresting it. Netanyahu himself repeatedly criticized the Oslo Accord as “a violation of the historic right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, and as a mortal danger to their security” (Netanyahu, 1995, P.103).

According to Marwan Kanafani, the year 1997 was the beginning of losing interest in the peace process for the two parties as a result of the Likud Party winning the Israeli elections and dictating their will (Kanafani, 2007, P. 379- 383).

Nevertheless, the US administration’s pressure compelled Netanyahu to sign two agreements and grant territory to the Palestinian Authority on those two occasions; The Hebron Protocol in 1997 and the Wye River Memorandum in 1998 (Shlaim, 2009, P. 203).

The fall of Netanyahu government was inevitable because of the basic contradiction between their declared policy of being motivated for peace with the Arab world and its ideological makeup, which militated against trading ‘Land for Peace’ (Shlaim, 2009, P. 204) (Kanafani, 2007, P. 408).

The Labor Party won the 1999 elections lead by Ehud Barak who presented himself as Rabin’s disciple.

The PNA and the international community were hoping that the Labor party would make up for the Likud’s delay in the progress of the Israeli - Palestinian peace talks. However, Barak was pressured to continue the Likud’s plan to build illegal settlement, thus, disappointing the public opinion (Kanafani, 2007, P. 422).

Nevertheless, Barak went for direct negotiations with the Palestinians on the technical level early that year. Those negotiations evolved to include the US mediator and as an outline for the negotiations of Camp David 2 – 2000.

1.3 The Israeli and Palestinian Relationships Prior to 2000

As in many conflicts, the two parties of the conflict are actually opponents; lacking trust and often having low expectations, which is the case in the Israeli - Palestinian conflict.

The Israeli - Palestinian relationship was antagonistic until Rabin became Israel's new Prime Minister; although the Palestinians had their reservations at that point, Oslo Accord was signed and Yasser Arafat shook hands with Rabin, the antagonistic picture was starting to dissolve (Kanafani, 2007, P. 316). New aspirations and dreams were taking place on both ends instead of the suspicion and hatred.

The general attitude was hopeful, especially after Jordan signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1994, and also after giving the Nobel Prize for Peace to Yasser Arafat, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin for producing the Oslo Accords.

Shortly after, the Peace Process had a major setback due to the assassination of Rabin in 1995. Rabin's assassination affected the peace process negatively because Rabin's interpersonal skills were a huge asset to the Israeli negotiator. The Palestinians felt that they could trust the Israelis because of Rabin (Shlaim, 2009, P. 202). But after the assassination, the Labor Party lost the elections.

When Netanyahu won the following elections in 1996, he made a few comments about Oslo Accord and how he did not believe in it (Netanyahu, 1995, P. 121). Understandably, the Palestinians believed that the Peace process has stopped and that Oslo Accord was put aside (Kanafani, 2007, P. 357). Netanyahu had a negative effect on the peace process moral and its believers, due to his actions; building new illegal settlements, arresting Palestinians, confiscating land and demolishing homes were some of Netanyahu's actions.

These actions were met by Hamas and Jihad operations and bombings in Israel during Netanyahu’s cycle.

When Ehud Barak of the Labor Party was elected prime minister, the international community and especially the Palestinians were hopeful but skeptical. At the beginning the Palestinians were happy with Barak’s speech and thoughts (Lalor, 2001, P. 162). But soon enough they changed their attitude towards the Israeli Prime Minister and to the peace process in general. Barak agreed at first to stop building settlement but after a while the pressure from the right wing parties had its toll on Barak, he succumbed to their will. The settlement building continued, so as to finish what they have started, and with that the hopes of the PNA (Kanafani, 2007, P. 422).

1.4 The US Role and Motives Prior to Camp David 2-2000

Ever since the United States of America gained its primacy in the world after the Cold War, it became involved on different levels in most of the conflicts in the world and especially the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The US role as a mediator was evident from the start in Madrid Conference in October 1991, which was initiated by the US president George H.W Bush who was from the Republican Party.

This conference brought a drastic change to the Arab-Israeli Conflict, particularly to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, for this was the start of the peace process.

Two years later, Oslo Accord was being signed by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, under the auspices of Bill Clinton who was the US president from the Democratic Party (Roy, 2002, P. 9)).

It was evident early on that the US administration is a major element in the Palestinian - Israeli conflict, due to their devotion towards mediating the negotiation. In addition to the US initiative that went step by step with the peace process since the very start.

The US mediator was always a favored one due to US status as a superpower and leverage. Furthermore, the Palestinians believe that the US administration is the only power in the world that could pressure the Israelis into reaching a mediated agreement (Kanafani, 2007, P. 425).

On the other hand, the special relationship that bonds Israel with the US is astonishingly deep rooted (Mearshmeir and Walt, 2007, P. 7); the ideological context of the U.S political parties has the Israeli relation as one of their corner stones. The Republican Party stand as a pro-Israeli party in which the relations with Israel and its security is important but not to jeopardize the US's interests and well being. While the Democratic Party has an 'Israel First' approach that believes in Israel and its security above everything (Shlaim, 2009, P. 153).

Another reason for choosing the US administration as a mediator is its leverage. The Israeli and the Palestinian parties both received US aids on many occasions as incentive to continue with the peace process. Although the Israeli side got the bigger split, for they have gained not only military and economic support, but also political benefits.

Having the Palestinians and the Israelis agree on the US administration as their mediator is a vital matter but the US role has to be assessed and analyzed, for better understanding.

The US role as a mediator is a difficult subject to tackle due to the different characteristics adopted by the mediator depending on various settings. These settings could range from

the parties themselves, to the context of the mediation and the timing. The international and regional aspects and the mediator's team itself and its level of involvement are yet another set of issues to be taken into consideration, In addition to other secondary factors that surely affect the role of the mediator.

But overall, The US mediation in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is mostly seen as active mediation; taking the role of the manipulator or formulator.

On 15th October 1998, the US administration headed by Bill Clinton mediated the talks between the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Palestinian National Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, where they were negotiating the Wye River Memorandum.

During the above mentioned negotiations, the US administration played many roles that contributed to the successful outcome of those talks. Those roles were many due to the active mediation of Bill Clinton.

At Wye River Conference center, the US mediator had many responsibilities such as creating a comfortable environment for the parties to feel at ease with, to bring the parties closer by inviting the late king of Jordan H.M King Hussein who bridged the gap between the two parties. Also, educating the parties of how to tackle the negotiated issues, building trust, exchanging ideas and notes between the parties, pressuring and inducing the parties to act in a way that would lead them to reach agreement. Thus, the US mediator had many roles at Wye River and those roles were a facilitator, formulator or messenger, educator, manipulator and intervener.

Being an active mediator is meant to point to the level of involvement of the US mediator which is also reflected through the skills practiced at Wye River and on many other occasions prior to Camp David 2 - 2000.

The set of skills which the US mediator used were:

- **Procedural skills**, in terms of selecting and arranging the venue, and managing the different details.

- **Active Listening skills**, this skill reflects analyzing the negotiation and the interchange of thoughts and by deeply listening and then providing feedback. It was the job of the US administration and delegation to understand the needs of the parties and try to close the gap between the two disputing parties. For example, Bill Clinton Invited the King of Jordan at the time, to the negotiations because he was respected and trusted by both parties. Clinton's invitation has led to signing the memorandum on the 23rd October 1998.

- **Communication skills**, these skills are important to get the ideas through the parties, so that the mediator can convince the conflicting parties and communicate correctly with them through direct communication channels. In addition to using the body language in order to explain the behavior and tone.

- **Linguistic skills,** this skill was not used by the mediator by speaking Arabic or Hebrew, but by understanding the culture of the parties. For example, Bill Clinton, the US mediator, understood that Arabs, Palestinians and especially Arafat give an acute importance to behaving in a demur manner

and show interest in person who treats them with respect and affection. Clinton certainly used that skill to befriend Arafat and influence him.

- **Information and knowledge about the conflict and the mediation**, acquiring the information and knowledge about the conflict was crucial for the US mediator to know the bottom lines for the two parties and have positive performance.

- **Presenting offers and proposals through framing and reframing them.**

The above mentioned skills were crucial for playing the role of the mediator. But the main factor that affected the US administration’s role as a mediator is the special relationship that bonds Israel and the US.

In John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s book ‘The Israel Lobby and the U.S. Foreign Policy’, they wrote: “For the past four decades, in fact, the united states has provided Israel with a level of material and diplomatic support that dwarfs what it provides to other countries, that aid is largely unconditional: no matter what Israel does, the level of support remains for the most part unchanged. In particular, the united states consistently favors Israel over the Palestinians and rarely puts pressure on the Jewish state…” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, P. 7).

Also according to Avi Shlaim, the US has given Israel since 1967 more than $92 billion in aid, and this aid continues to the tune of $3 billion a year (Shlaim, 2009, P. 283).

Therefore, it has been perceived that US administration is a bias mediator towards the Israeli side, with the aim to have them comfortable and extend some concessions to the Palestinian Party.

Some scholars such as Sadia Toval and W. Zartman contested that the bias mediator might work in the mediation process through influencing the favored party to offer more to the weaker party, and the weaker party who is not favored, would be trying to impress the mediator and give concessions (Touval and Zartman, 1985, P. 7- 17). This logic might have worked at the initial stage of Camp David 2 – 2000 but at the end it backfired into a failure.

The US superpower state motives for mediating Camp David 2 – 2000 were numerous; the first motive that is seen in most mediation processes is bringing peace to the world and the need to maintain peace and stability in order to protect their political, economical and social interests.

The second motive is to enhance the US's influence over the world and improve their status, especially with mediating and trying to resolve such a protracted conflict that has been going on for over half a century. The resolution of this conflict by the US administration is an achievement that would be recognized by the world for decades.

As for the third motive it is the Israeli - US's relationship; the Democratic Party represented by Bill Clinton, the US president, have the notion of 'Israeli First'. Furthermore, the Israeli lobby in the US is observing the mediations and is indirectly dictating their will on the US administration (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, P. 10).

Therefore, it was important to mediate the negotiations to monitor the flow of ideas and help the Israeli side have their objectives.

Another motive for the US to mediate the Israeli - Palestinian peace talk at Camp David 2 – 2000 is having the approval and acceptance from the Arabs who are calling for justice of

the Palestinian people, particularly the gulf, producing oil states which would affect the US's economical interests in terms of oil prices, companies working at the gulf area and mutual economical interests.

The fifth and final motive is the personal motive for the US President Bill Clinton, where mediating such a conflict is considered one of the most important accomplishments in the presidency cycle. Furthermore, Clinton would expunge his past mistakes as a President in the case of Camp David 2-2000 success.

Bill Clinton had been the US president since 1992 for eight years, where he had witnessed, prepared and hosted many peace talks to the Israeli and the Palestinian sides. The years 1993 and 1995 witnessed the signing of Oslo Accords which were under Clinton's auspices. In addition to that Bill Clinton overlooked the Hebron agreement in 1997 which was under the supervision of US Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

Furthermore, Bill Clinton had invested his effort and time in Wye River Memorandum where he had hosted the two sides and personally mediated and pushed them to agree on the memoranda. Countless other meetings took place with the help of the US administration headed by Bill Clinton, which were not successful.

Bill Clinton had the Palestinian - Israeli Conflict under his sight for eight straight years, so it was rewarding for him to have the peace talks concluded and the conflict resolved, particularly when his presidency cycle would be ending by January, 2001. It is worth mentioning that Clinton's Presidency term was stained with the Lewinsky Affair which was a mistake that Clinton worked hard to eradicate. Furthermore, managing to resolve

the Palestinian – Israeli conflict would be an accomplishment that would record his name in history.

1.5 Nature of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The nature of the conflict is one of the most important pillars in every negotiation. This nature can be identified through assessing the issues, the intensity and complexity of the disputed issues. The main disputed issues in the Palestinian - Israeli conflict are the territories and the 1967 borders, Jerusalem and the sacred places, the refugees and the settlements. In addition to other disputed issues such as self determination for the Palestinian people, and the water issue.

To review the disputed issues and how they are perceived by each party, a quick overview on the intensity and the complexity of those issues is due.

Various scholars suggested diverse means to measure the intensity, the most applicable and practical measure for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was that of Dean Pruitt, where has been used here to measure the level of intensity of the Palestinian - Israeli conflict.

Dean Pruitt measures the level of intensity through measuring the severity of the conflict, level of hostility and anger and the strength of misperceptions. Taking into consideration the history of the conflict and the fact that the Palestinian Israeli conflict has been going on for over sixty years now with two Intifadas and three wars, would put forward the notion that it is a highly intense conflict (Pruitt, 1991, P. 26-47).

As for the complexity it is determined through the number of parties involved in the conflict and the rigidity of the disputed issues. The number of the conflicting parties is two and the disputed issues mentioned above reflect the complexity of the conflict. The conflict is considered complex because the disputed issues are rigid and not very amenable to resolution while having the number of conflicting parties to a minimal two makes the

conflict less complex and more amenable to resolution. Also it is worth stating that the types of the issues in addition to the disputed issues involved are the determinant factors that makes this conflict a highly complex one.

According to Jacop Bercovish there are five categories to describe the tangible and intangible types of disputed issues: sovereignty, ideology, security, independence, and all other issues (Bercovish, 1996, P. 24). Those types of issues are all manifested in the Israeli - Palestinian conflict.

The issues of this conflict are interrelated; the self determination issue concerning the Palestinian side cannot be resolved without handling the sovereignty or territorial issue, which comes to affect Israel issue of security. Those issues according to Bercovish are rigid and complex. On the other hand, the scholar Howard Raiffa contends that having rigid and complex issues means having more trade-offs (Raiffa, 2003, P. 148) .

The conflict's disputed issues are discussed hereunder, in terms of each party's outlook towards a specific disputed issue.

The first disputed issue to be discussed is the territory and the borders.

In September 1993, at Oslo Accord, the PLO and the government of Israel agreed that Resolutions 242 and 338 should be the basis for negotiations with Israel when it signed the Declaration of Principles (Roy, 2002, P. 12).

The Resolution 242 is a formula adopted by the UN Security Council for the Arab - Israeli Conflict on 22nd November, 1967, that deals with five principles; withdrawal of Israeli forces, 'peace within secure and recognized boundaries', freedom of navigation, a just settlement of the refugee problem and security measures including demilitarized zones.

The resolution also calls for the implementation of the "land for peace" formula, calling for Israeli withdrawal from "territories" it had occupied in 1967 in exchange for peace with its neighbors (Security Council Resolutions, 1967).

The Palestinian negotiators claim a return to the 1967 border as the boundary for a future Palestinian state.[4] The Arab League has supported these boundaries as the borders of the future State of Palestine.

The Palestinian negotiators requested full Palestinian sovereignty over the entire West Bank including the East of Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. They maintained that Resolution 242 calls for full Israeli withdrawal from these territories as part of a final peace settlement, although Israel disputes this interpretation of Resolution 242.

The two main Israeli parties, Likud and Labor parties have different views regarding the principle of Partition; the Likud rejects partition as a basis for a settlement, laying claim to the whole territory west of the Jordan River. The Labor Party, on the other hand, accepts the principle of partition as a basis for a settlement although they were resistant at most negotiations with the Palestinians to return to complete 1967 borders.

The Israelis negotiators wanted to annex the numerous settlement blocks on the Palestinian side of the 1967 border, and were concerned that a complete return to the 1967 borders was dangerous to Israel's security.

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[4] The 1967 borders are the 1949 armistice line (that is the Green Line).

The importance of Jerusalem city to both the Palestinian and the Israeli has also complicated the negotiations. This Jerusalem issue do overlap with the sovereignty, ideology, security, settlements and the borders issues.

Jerusalem is divided into two regions, west and center of Jerusalem which contains the Israeli people and many Israeli settlements, and the east of Jerusalem which encompasses the old city and the Palestinian population living there with some illegal Israeli settlements.

In 1980, Israel annexed East Jerusalem to their proclaimed capital Jerusalem, but United Nations Security Council Resolution 478 declared it "null and void" and required that it be rescinded, stating that it was a violation of international law. Therefore, the annexation lacks international recognition (Shlaim, 2009, P. 255).

On the other hand, The Palestinians claim that East Jerusalem is a part of the occupied West Bank within the boundaries of the "1967 borders". Furthermore, the Palestinian National Authority views the future permanent status of East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state (Rubenberg, 2003, P. 193).

It is critical to state that the Labor Party sees that the Palestinians are entitled to have East of Jerusalem with some limitations regarding Israel’s security (Shlaim, 2009, P. 171). But the Likud Party rejects the idea and considers East Jerusalem as part of their unified capital ‘Jerusalem’.

Another outlook for this issue is the ideological and religious aspect; it is known that Jerusalem contains sacred sites for the three religions; Islam, Christianity and Judaism, and that those holy sites are located in a small area very close to each other. The sovereignty over those holy sites is considered the main issue.

The Palestinians demanded complete sovereignty over the holy sites in East Jerusalem, in particular, the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, which is a site that is holy in both Islam and Judaism. The Palestinians have also demanded the dismantling of all the Israeli neighborhoods or settlements in East Jerusalem. The Palestinians also indicated that the Jewish quarter and Western Wall should be placed under Israeli authority, not Israeli sovereignty (Kanafani, 2007, P. 434).

On the other hand, Israel proposed that the Palestinians be granted "custodianship," though not sovereignty, on the Temple Mount, with Israel retaining sovereignty over the Western Wall, the remnant of the Second Temple.

As for the refugee issue and the right of return, Palestinian refugees are people whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict.

One-third of the registered Palestine refugees at UNRWA, nearly 1.4 million, live in 58 recognized refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (UNRWA, 2011).

This issue was addressed through UN General Assembly Resolution 194 which stated that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible (United Nations' General Assembly,1948).

The Palestinians have demanded full implementation of the right of return, meaning that each refugee would be granted the option of returning to his or her home, with property restored, or accept compensation instead (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2003).

However, Israel's political party, Likud rejected the calls, fearing that the big number of refugees would demographically overwhelm the country and threaten the existence of Israel. But the Labor Party have accepted this right with some limitation; restricting the number of refugees returning to their homes and allowing limited number of refugees back to be reunited with their families in the west bank (Shlaim, 2009, P. 273).

As for the settlements issue, it concerns the illegal Israeli Settlements. Those settlements could be found in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

The International Court of Justice and the international community define these settlements are illegal, although Israel disputes this. The United Nations has repeatedly upheld the view that Israel's construction of settlements constitutes violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2003).

Israeli policies toward these settlements have ranged from active promotion to removal by force. The ongoing settlement construction by Israel is frequently criticized as an obstacle to the peace process by the United Nations and third parties including the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States (Kanafani, 2007, P. 423).

The other issues are the security and the self determination. The two dominant parties of Israel have two different outlooks on the issue; the Likud denies that the Palestinians have any right to self determination within 1967 borders. On the other hand, the Labor Party

allows it, conditioned by Israel's security. The problem about the notion of security is that it denies the basic human rights of the Palestinians, which is a major reason for the lack of progress in the peace talks (Shlaim, 2009, P. 267).

Many negotiations have taken place to resolve all the above mentioned issues but have not reached an acceptable formula for the disputing parties.

1.6 Timing of the negotiations at Camp David 2-2000

According to William Zartman, the ripeness theory discusses the right time to intervene and initiate a negotiation. The ripeness theory contains four elements; the first being mutually hurting stalemate, the second is having an eminent mutual catastrophy, the third element is the entrapment where the pursuit of victory is not held down by the cost even if it is unbearable, and the last element is enticing opportunity where a more optimistic view of leaders in conflict is visible, suggesting that a ripe moment can occur when leaders foresee a better way of achieving their goals rather than continuing with the costly struggle. New options open up or are created which cost less and offer more likely gains than continued violence and mutual coercion. The emphasis is on new benefits rather than existing or anticipated costs, on rewards for adopting alternatives rather than on sacrifices that have to be compensated (Mitchell, 1995, P. 15). An example to this element is the change of Israeli leadership in 1992 from Likud to Labor and the impact it had on the peace process.

On the 5th of July, 2000 President Clinton announced his invitation to Barak and Arafat, to come to Camp David Plantation to continue their negotiations in an attempt to negotiate a "final status settlement" to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

There was a hopeful precedent in the 1978 Camp David Accords where the US President Jimmy Carter was able to broker a peace agreement between Egypt, represented by President Anwar Sadat, and Israel represented by Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

Camp David 2 – 2000 took place on the 11th of July and lasted for fourteen days. But was July 2000 a ripe time to intervene?

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has stalemated at that period due to many reasons. First, the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1995, allowed the Likud Party to gain power which translates to escalating the conflict and jeopardizing the peace process.

According to Netanyahu, the rise of the Likud government to power in May 1996 which was headed by Binyamin Netanyahu, dealt a heavy blow to the Oslo Peace Process signed the year 1993 by Rabin and Arafat. Netanyahu was a bitter opponent of the Oslo accord, viewing it as incompatible both with Israel's security and with its historic right to the Biblical homeland (Nentanyahu, 1995, P. 121).

In 1999, after three years of a Likud-led government, where only two agreements have been signed, the Israeli elections were won by the Labor party, headed by Ehud Barak.

An enticing opportunity is being created by having Barak as the Israeli Prime Minister, the new leadership, triggered a stalemate after the escalation of the Likud Party. In addition to the hopes that Barak will follow Rabin's footsteps. This variable has led to the ripeness of the negotiations, especially after the failure of the Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks.

The Israeli-Syrian Peace talks early in the year 2000, took place between Ehud Barak, the Israeli prime minister, Hafez el-Assad, the Syrian president, and mediated by Bill Clinton, the American president.

The talks collapsed because the two parties did not agree. On one hand, Syria wanted a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, which Israel has occupied since 1967. In addition to being granted an access to the Sea of Galilee, which was a matter of

sovereignty. While on the other hand, Israel was not willing to give Syria access to the Sea of Galilee, because it was a matter, allegedly, of security (Shlaim, 2009, P. 271).

The failed Syrian-Israeli talks, the high expectations from Ehud Barak as the Israeli Prime Minister, the fall of the Likud Party, having Yasser Arafat as the PNA president who represented most of the Palestinians and Bill Clinton as the US mediator, all of these variables point to the fact that the conflict has stalemated and has become ripe for intervention. However, it is critical to state that the Israeli perusal of peace on the Syrian track instead of seeking Peace with the Palestinians, have created negative feelings of distrust and unworthiness among the Palestinians which was fueled when the Syrian-Israeli Peace Talks failed (Shlaim, 2009, P. 272).

After the failed Syrian-Israeli Peace Talks, Bill Clinton sent the invitations to the two sides based on the persistence of Ehud Barak and his optimistic line “I have an offer that the Palestinians Cannot refuse” (Clinton, 2004, P. 913); expecting them to arrive to Camp David Plantation in six days.

One explanation for this short period of time to prepare for Camp David 2 – 2000 is the Prime Ministerial cycle and the Israeli elections which were to take place in February 2001 as a result of Barak’s falling coalition. Ehud Barak’s term as a Prime Minister was soon to be over or repeated based upon the elections’ result. This fact supports the conviction that Ehud Barak and his delegation were rushing the negotiation from the very start (Hanieh, 2000, P. 3).

Another explanation is Clinton's presidency cycle ending by January, 2001 which gave him only six months before the end of his term. Thus, Bill Clinton was time pressured and might have rushed through the pre-negotiation stage of Camp David 2 - 2000.

That phase, the pre-negotiation stage, is considered by scholars the most important stage in the negotiations for many different reasons. The main reasons that affected Camp David 2 – 2000 were that the pre-negotiation stage functions as an opportunity to assess the risks that would be taken at the process, it was essential to check public and regional support, in addition to generating them, and creating mutual confidence building measures especially after the distrust and disappointment that characterized the Palestinian – Israeli relationship during the prime ministry cycle of Netanyahu.

To sum it up, a quick and short pre-negotiation stage is certainly a setback to the negotiations particularly in protracted conflicts.

The pre-negotiation stage at Camp David 2 – 2000 appears to be rushed especially after denying Arafat's request for postponing the talks so that they can have an extra time to prepare for the negotiations since it was early from his point of view.

According to Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, Arafat pleaded for additional time to prepare the ground for the negotiations and warned Clinton of the danger that the summit would explode in his face unless progress was made in narrowing the gap between the two sides (Agha and Malley, 2001, P. 6).

It is valid to state here that the pre-negotiation stage needed more attention from the US administration, and that variable might have cost all sides the peace settlement.

Chapter Two

2. Israeli–Palestinian Peace Talks at Camp David 2–2000

In this chapter the process variables are analyzed to understand the impact they had on the outcome of the negotiations at Camp David 2 – 2000. The process variables include the delegations and their relationship, the Israeli and Palestinian motives, strategies and Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA's), the regional and international context regarding the Camp David 2-2000 talks, in addition to the negotiations and the Israeli offer. Furthermore, the US mediator and its conduct during Camp David 2 - 2000 is assessed.

2.1 Preparation for Camp David 2 - 2000 Talks – the US Invitation

The preparation for the Camp David 2-2000 talks cannot be analyzed in isolation of the continuing and intermittent talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. However, the months prior to the talks at Camp David warrant special attention to understand the process variables and the negotiations context. It is pivotal to understand the events associated with signing the Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum and the discussions that took place in the following months, as they set the preparation context for Camp David 2 -2000.

After the signing of the Sharm El Shiek Memorandum in Sept 1999, the Israelis and the Palestinians entered into discussions on implementation action. The talks extended beyond Feb 2000, which was the deadline for reaching a framework agreement on permanent status on Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders and water as a first step to achieve a

peace treaty (Lalor, 2001, P. 165). The lack of progress on the final status was evident earlier, and the implementation of framework agreement was stalled.

During that period, the Israelis and the Palestinians held many brainstorming sessions, which ultimately led to another secret negotiations between the parties. On May 10, 2000 those secret negotiations were brokered in what has become defined as the "Stockholm track." These back channel talks were directed and attended by Palestinian negotiators Ahmad Qrie'a known as Abu Ala' and Hassan Asfour, as well as Israeli negotiators Shlomo Ben-Ami and Gilead Sher (Posner, 2003, P. 49).

The Stockholm track was viewed as a productive development in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, and both parties declared that new and creative ideas were discussed. The parties made progress on the issues of territory, borders, security, and even refugees. However, the substance of these talks was leaked to the Israeli newspapers, and negatively affected the positions of both parties. Both Barak and Arafat faced political challenges from what went into the press about the potential concessions that each party was willing to make.

According to Martin Indyk, former American ambassador to Israel, the Stockholm track had the potential to lay down a solid foundation for Camp David 2 - 2000 negotiations, but it was aborted following the media leakage (Sontag, 2001, P. 27). However, the Stockholm track had a positive influence on the delegations; the delegations' relationship had evolved over the secret meetings into a good trusting relationship. This good relationship had a positive effect on the negotiations at Camp David 2-2000.

Following the talks in Sweden, the US administration attempted to mediate between the two sides on different occasions but was unsuccessful. This has negatively affected the Israeli–Palestinian relationships.

Many countries raised their voices calling for reaching an agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians including the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, and US President who went publicly announcing that failure to reach an agreement by September 2000 would cause the collapse of the Peace Process (Kanafani, 2007, P. 432).

With the hopes of rescuing the Peace Process, the US administration sent Secretary of State Ms. Madeline Albright to discuss and deliver the Israelis and the Palestinians an invitation to Camp David to negotiate a final status agreement.

Chairman Yasser Arafat had his reservations on entering into another round of negotiations at Camp David. Chairman Arafat stated that Barak is stalling the implementation of the past agreements and added that no negotiation can succeed without total adherence to the already concluded agreements (Enderlin, 2002, P. 158). Furthermore, he was disappointed from the Stockholm Track, and believed that negotiations progress was unsatisfactory (Hanieh, 2000, P. 4). And finally, he believed that the Israeli prime minister was in a much stronger position in the negotiations, as he suggested the idea of Camp David mediation to present the Palestinian team with an offer. This according to Arafat would inevitably lead to an unstable, hegemonic peace at best (Roy, 2002, P. 11).

With his serious reservations on the Camp David invitation, Chairman Arafat’s asked to delay Camp David 2 – 2000 to enable the Palestinians to prepare for the negotiations. Arafat’s request was met with US rejection. This rejection and the short preparation time

for the Camp David 2 – 2000, raised Arafat's suspicions towards Israel and the US. He believed that there was a conspiracy by the Israelis and the Americans to pressure the Palestinians to agree to an unfair settlement.

Chairman Arafat set several conditions for agreeing to go to Camp David 2-2000 talks. First, he sought additional preparatory talks to ensure that Camp David 2 - 2000 would not fail (Hanieh, 2000, P. 4). Second, he requested that the stalled implementation of Oslo accord that is the third Israeli territorial withdrawal be implemented before the summit of Camp David 2 - 2000 began. And third, as suggested by President Clinton rather than demanded by Chairman Arafat, Chairman Arafat was promised that the U.S. would remain neutral and would not blame the Palestinians in case Camp David talks fail. (Clinton, 2004, P. 914). Ultimately, however, none of these conditions were met.

US President Clinton, who is a Democrat, issued invitations on the fourth of July, 2000 for a trilateral Middle East Peace Summit to be held in Camp David on 11st of July 2000.

Camp David's Resort was chosen as the place of the venue due to its significant historic status, where US President also from the Democrats Party, Jimmy Carter mediated the summit in 1978 at the Camp David Resort which led to signing the peace agreement bearing the Resort's name, between the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister from the Likud Party, Menahem Begin. This historic event has various elements that Camp David 2–2000 took advantage of: first, the peace treaty is the first peace agreement to be concluded between Israel and an Arab country through US mediation. Second, the Democratic US President is the mediator. Third, the Israeli Prime Minister who signed the agreement is from the right-wing party. Fourth, the venue of the mediations is the Resort of Camp David in the state of Maryland in the US.

The success of Camp David Accords of 1978 had affected Camp David 2–2000 in a way that made the US team study the 1978 mediation prior to the start of the summit, in addition to that the elements of Camp David Accords were used in Camp David 2–2000 to materialize the same outcome of the 1978 mediation.

As for choosing the venue of Camp David 2-2000, according to President Bill Clinton, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak went to Camp David early the year 2000 and personally met with Clinton there on a social level, when Barak proposed having mediation sessions between the Palestinians and the Israelis at Camp David (Clinton, 2004, P. 867). Barak asked that the talks be held in Camp David not only due to its location and historical significance, but also to remind leaders of the opposition Likud Party that he was following the footsteps of Menahem Begin, since Barak was beleaguered by divisions in his government coalition and by a strong opposition campaign from the Likud Party (Hanieh, 2000, P. 5).

2.2 The Israeli and Palestinian Delegations and their Relationship

At Camp David 2–2000, the Israeli delegation was led by Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Barak was a decorated general and from his days of strategic planning in the army, Barak’s negotiation tactics were said to be clear and inflexible, conceived and then frozen in his mind. However, Barak was a desirable negotiating partner, for his inflexible strategy simultaneously accounted for the risks necessary in order to reach a final deal. Furthermore, according to Avi Shlaim, Barak was politically immature and lacking in interpersonal qualities that seriously affected his negotiating style (Shlaim, 2009, P. 204). Unlike Rabin, Barak was never able to create a working relationship with Arafat.

The Israeli delegation also comprised skilled negotiators as Ben Ami, Gilad Sher, Dan Meridor, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Gidi Greenstein, and Joseph Alpher, but because there were internal divisions among them and lack of intra-party cohesion in general, Barak had the final word.

Thus, in the end, it was Barak's personality, language, and negotiating tactics that ultimately characterized the Israeli negotiating team (Posner, 2003, P. 53).

As for the Palestinian delegation, it was led by Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, as well as the president of the PNA since January 1996.

Many people question Arafat's leverage over the Palestinians given the numerous internal and ideological divisions among PNA groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. However, even if Arafat may not have full control over his people, Arafat did have ultimate leverage and authority over his negotiating team, which included Ahmad Qrie'a (Abu Ala'), Saeb Erekat, Muhammad Rashid, Muhammad Dahlan, and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen).

At Camp David 2–2000, there was difficulty in the negotiating process due to the obvious differences on the cultural and the personal level between the two sides. Moreover, Dennis Ross, the US envoy for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, mentioned in his book 'The Missing Peace' that Barak did not know how to deal with the Palestinian side and that the cultural difference produced a shift between the two sides (as cited in Shlaim, 2009). The cultural difference played a major role in fueling distrust between the two parties and upsetting the progress at Camp David 2 – 2000.

According to Malley and Agha, there was a lack of intra-party cohesion, particularly within the Palestinian delegation**.** As they explained, "domestic hostility toward the

summit exacerbated the tensions among the dozen or so Palestinian negotiators," causing them to "act disparately and without a central purpose, each giving preeminence to a particular issue, making virtually impossible the kinds of trade - offs that, inevitably, a compromise would entail." (Agha and Malley, 2002, P. 15).

The lack of intra-party cohesion was manifested through having different members of the Palestinian and Israeli delegations who understood and articulated their party's interests, position, priorities, goals, and tactics differently, which ultimately led to the failure of reaching an acceptable agreement with one another. Furthermore, this lack of internal cohesion prevented each side from preparing their publics for the difficult compromises to-be-made at Camp David 2 – 2000 (Agha and Malley, 2002, P. 17).

The US Team tried to bring the two delegations closer through having different activities over the course of the negotiations, in order to bridge the gap between the two parties (Kanafani, 2007). And many remarked on the closeness between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations outside the negotiation rooms particularly when they met previously in many meetings and have evolved a good relationship, but there was an extreme coldness between Barak and Arafat, themselves.

The two leaders were unable to easily face each other. In fact, aside from the two joint sessions convened by Clinton, they had only one face-to-face interaction during the two weeks of living on the same grounds (Hanieh, 2000, P. 7-8).

Because of this distrust and discomfort between negotiating partners at Camp David 2 - 2000, all ideas and proposals were conveyed verbally, via the U.S. mediator. That way, parties were not bound to position statements or compromises made.

Furthermore, Clinton remarked that Barak was so tense and worried during the negotiation because he was afraid that Arafat would take the concessions made on the Israeli side in order to use as a starting-point for future negotiation and give nothing in return meanwhile (Clinton, 2004, P. 913). These claims reflect the lack of trust between the two leaders and the poor relationship between the disputants.

Given the prominent role of the U.S. as mediator and Israeli - ally, the Palestinians perceived each Camp David 2 - 2000 proposal as an American, not an Israeli, concept that was being put forward to them to either accept or reject (Hanieh, 2000, P. 8). The Palestinians commonly rejected these proposals without offering counter-proposals of their own either because they believed them to be lacking in detail or to be part of the "U.S.-Israel conspiracy" (Shlaim, 2009, P. 274).

During Camp David 2–2000 the negotiations were difficult, particularly due to domestic hostility toward the summit in both Israel and Palestine, and therefore this situation made the negotiators in Camp David fearful of adopting positions that might undermine their support back home (Shlaim, 2009, P. 270). Moreover, internal divisions and a lack of intra-party cohesion made communication and negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators even more difficult.

At Camp David 2 – 2000, Chairman Arafat reiterated his position not only as a Palestinian leader, but also as a representative of the Arabs and Muslims who have emotional and religious attachment to Jerusalem and Palestine, and believe in the right of the Palestinians to achieve their rights according to International Resolutions.

Arafat's stand was that the occupier is the one who should provide more concessions to reach agreements. He also feared the consequences that he might ultimately have to face back home if he delivered a mediocre agreement to his constituents (Hanieh, 2000, P.32).

Barak, on the other hand had other concerns; the stability of his coalition in Israel was falling apart. Barak and his delegation may have used this argument to get more concessions from the Palestinians. They argued that without these concessions the current government will not continue to exist (Hanieh, 2000, P.11).

2.3 Israeli and Palestinian Motives and Strategies

It is natural for both parties to have underlying motives for their participation in the Peace Process. With these motives, Palestinians and Israelis came to Camp David 2–2000 to negotiate an agreement.

Israel had many motives which include their interests; it had domestic security and economic concerns, a desire for regional acceptance, as well as an investment in acquiring a positive reputation in the international arena (Roy, 2004, P. 12).

Those motives led Barak to strongly believe that Israel had to settle and make peace with the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world. Therefore, it was no longer possible for Israel to rule over another people without continued violence, which was already taking place in Israel due to Palestinian frustration with the Peace Process as mentioned earlier (Morris, 2001, P.1-2).

Furthermore, after Netanyahu's long years of opposing the Peace Process, it was in Barak's hands to move the Peace Process back on track. Also Barak's failing coalition in the year 2000 triggered the right motion although hasty.

On the other hand, The Palestinians' motive has been to establish a homeland with East Jerusalem as their capital; a viable state over which they would have sole sovereignty. Furthermore, Arafat wanted a state that is secure and independent, without Israeli intervention or any of their settlements.

He also hoped that all the Palestinians acquire their rights fully including the right of return for the refugees (Posner, 2003, P. 57). Bill Clinton mentioned in his book that Arafat wanted a solution to the refugee problem that did not require him to give up the principle of the right of return (Clinton, 2004, P. 913).

The Israelis and Palestinians came to Camp David 2 – 2000, to have those interests come to sight. Thus, each party came to the mediations with a planned strategy.

Israel's strategy was based upon the belief that the final position and the bottom line should not be revealed to the Palestinians or even to the US team. In his book, Clinton remarked that he did not know what Barak's bottom line at the negotiation was (Clinton, 2004, P. 912).

At Camp David 2-2000, Barak decided to start with less concessions given to the Palestinians than he ultimately was willing to make, and his wide-ranging package to the Palestinians was presented as take it all or leave it all package.

Ahsyia Posner stated that Barak planned for the negotiations to be conducted within that framework of a comprehensive package that, once agreed to by the Palestinians, the Israeli public would be asked to accept it in a national referendum (Posner, 2003, P. 54).

When the US administration sent the invitations to Barak and Arafat, Barak stated that he has an offer that the Palestinians cannot refuse (Clinton, 2003, P. 911). In Barak's outlook to Camp David 2 – 2000, he was positive that the talks would be successful due to many elements. The first element is the US pressure on the Palestinian side, particularly when Clinton has known Arafat since 1993 and evolved a special relationship with him. Second element is the inclusive package which tempts the Palestinians into agreeing on a final status agreement. And the third element is overlooking past agreements and understandings. In addition to avoiding the type of domestic constituency constraints, that was practiced by Israeli Likud leaders.

As for Arafat and the Palestinian delegation, they went to Camp David 2 – 2000, skeptical of the negotiations, suspecting that there is an Israeli–US conspiracy that aims to pressure them into agreeing to an unfair agreement, which reinforced their position as the protector of the Palestinians and Muslims around the world.

Moreover, Arafat and the Palestinian team believed that Camp David 2–2000 was rushed and that the timing was premature. Therefore, they did not have a defined negotiation strategy.

According to Bill Clinton, Arafat came to Camp David 2–2000 without having negotiating lines or arguments. Clinton also mentioned that “Arafat was new to the negotiation

business" (Clinton, 2004, P.912), which was peculiar since Arafat had been negotiating with the Israelis for over nine years.

At Camp David 2–2000, the Palestinian delegation and Arafat acted with caution because they did not trust Israel to sign a fair agreement or even implement the agreement it had signed. This thinking was based on past agreements which were still not implemented as mentioned earlier.

Furthermore, Arafat disliked Barak's approach of final status agreement that no longer applies after its refusal and was stunned that Barak decided to over throw past agreements and UN Resolutions and craft a new agreement with a full package (Shlaim, 2009, P. 218).

At the negotiation sessions in Camp David 2-2000, the Palestinian delegation was organized in a manner that allows each negotiator, discuss one issue at a time. For example Ahmad Qrie'a was responsible for the territory and borders issue.

Moving to the issue of Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) which was discussed heavily in the well-known book of Roger Fisher and William Ury 'Getting to Yes', this term BATNA reflects the alternative each party has, if the negotiations come to an end without settlement (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991, P. 97).

Israel's BATNA is constrained in two or three alternatives; the first alternative is maintaining the status–quo with the Palestinians, administering their transports and labor workers and being cautious towards any bombing operation that Hamas or Jihad might execute. Another alternative is attacking the Palestinians in view of the fact that Israel's hard power is more prominent. The last alternative for Israel that no one predicted, since it was against the international law, was to construct a dividing wall with tanks that cuts-off

the West Bank from Israel in order to protect the Israelis from any suicidal bombings according to the Israeli government.

However, in the view of the Israeli's interests mentioned earlier, it was unlikely that Israel would adopt the first or second alternative, but rather choose Camp David 2 – 2000 or opt for the third alternative.

To the Palestinians, their BATNA revolves around defending their rights, maintaining the UN Resolutions and struggling violently against the Israelis in what is called the Intifada.

Given the outcome of Camp David 2–2000, it seems that the Palestinians preferred their BATNA over the agreement of Camp David 2 – 2000, because they did not trust the Israelis or the American team to follow through with the agreement or even implement it since they have not kept a good record of maintaining and implementing past agreements.

The agreement in Camp David 2 – 2000, to them, seemed vague, hazardous and unenforceable particularly when there is no guarantee that the Israelis would put into practice the agreement or that the US administration would hold the Israelis accountable in case they do not.

2.4 The Negotiations at Camp David 2-2000

The Palestinian and the Israeli delegations arrived to Camp David Resort on the 11st of July. Shortly after, the two parties were to form different committees to negotiate each disputed issue separately (Hanieh, 2000, P. 13).

The first committee was created to discuss the refugees' issue, but it did not move forward throughout the period of the negotiations since Israel denies its responsibility in causing

the refugees issue and rather express sorrow over what happened to the Palestinians as a result of the Arab–Israeli war of 1948. Talking about the right of return of the Palestinians was considered a taboo for the Israelis; therefore it was a difficult issue to address.

During the negotiations Israel would only discuss the compensation for the refugees, in addition to the Jew refugees who left Arab states to Israel, financed by the International Community and allowing several thousand people to return from Southern Lebanon within ten years through ‘family reunification’ and ‘humanitarian cases’ (Pressman, 2003, P. 20).

Another committee was the Borders committee which was combined with the security committee on several occasions to discuss the issues of the territory, borders and security.

One point that these committees focused on was the valley of Jordan, where the Israeli negotiators expressed their concern towards ‘the danger from the East’ according to Pressman. The Israelis demanded strong presence for them to monitor the Palestinian borders and inspecting goods imported to the West Bank, through having many bases, patrols and early warning stations along the borders and in the Valley of Jordan, to which Palestinian negotiators rejected stating that this area should be a sovereign Palestinian area. Another point that the Israeli negotiator demanded was that Israel would impose strict restriction on the military personnel and capabilities of the state of Palestine. A third point raised was the territory; the Israeli negotiators wanted to annex around 10% – 13.5% of the West Bank in order to take control over three settlement blocks in the north, center and south of the West Bank in addition to the passages that connects them. As a result of the integration of these three settlement blocs, the West Bank would be split into cantons: northern, central, and southern (Roy, 2002, P. 12).

It is worth stating that the land Israel wishes to annex controls the Palestinian water resources in the West Bank. Therefore, during the negations of these two committees the Palestinian negotiators refused to discuss the third point and rejected the Israeli demands (Hanieh, 2000, P. 15).

As for the Jerusalem committee, the Israelis had three concerns; first they insisted on having sovereignty over the Haram Al Sharif, which is the Temple Mount, which was met with Palestinian rejection. The US Team mediated a solution in which the Palestinians would have sovereignty on what is over the land and Israel would have sovereignty under it.

The second concern was the sovereignty over East Jerusalem and particularly the Old City; the Israelis proposed gaining sovereignty over the Armenian and Jewish Quarters and the Western Wall, and having the Muslim and Christian Quarters under the Palestinian control. The Palestinians were concerned that the Israelis are only willing to give them administrative autonomy.

The third concern is the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem; the Israelis discussed the settlements and proposed putting them under Israel's sovereignty which would turn East Jerusalem into an encircled and divided East Jerusalem that is cut off from its Palestinian neighborhoods. The issue of deducted land was met by offering the Palestinians land in the Negev desert.

Furthermore, during the negotiations the Palestinian delegation headed by Arafat adopted three matters; the first was the Palestinian people, and the existence of the Palestinian system. The second matter that was the focus of the Palestinian negotiator was the rights,

history and the International legality of the Palestinian cause, according to UN Resolutions 242, 338 and 194. The final issue that was the focal point during Camp David 2 – 2000 was the Arab, Islamic and Christian Dimensions; this issue was important throughout the negotiation sessions regarding the issue of Jerusalem and the holy places where the Palestinians considered themselves negotiating on behalf of the Muslims, Christians and the Arab Countries particularly when negotiating the issue of Jerusalem, the Temple Mount and the other holy places (Hanieh, 2000, P. 18-20).

The above mentioned negotiation sessions took place in the morning and at the afternoon, but in the evening and the night-time, President Clinton usually had debate sessions with Arafat or Barak concerning Jerusalem issue or other difficult matters.

The first week of Camp David 2–2000 was spent in negotiations and setting the bases for an agreement, which at the end, the Palestinian delegation did not accept.

According to Malley and Agha, those bases translate into Palestine having sovereignty over 91 percent of the West Bank; Israel would annex 9 percent of the West Bank (Agha and Malley, 2001, P. 7).

As for the sensitive issue of refugees, the proposal spoke only of a satisfactory solution. Even on Jerusalem, many blanks remained to be filled in. Arafat was told that Palestine would have sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City, but was only offered a permanent custodianship over the Haram al-Sharif, the third holiest site in Islam. So The status of the rest of the city would fluctuate between Palestinian sovereignty and functional autonomy (Agha and Malley, 2001, P.7).

Early on the second week, the US Team communicated to the Palestinian delegation an Israeli offer which was never stated in writing, but orally conveyed. The offer did not meet the Palestinian requirements and was rejected without suggesting improvements or a counter–offer.

President Bill Clinton delayed his flight to the next day which was scheduled to take him to Okinawa, Japan to attend the G-8 summit of industrial countries. The purpose of this delay was to pressure the Palestinians to accept the Israeli offer, however Clinton’s attempts had failed (Hanieh, 2000, P. 25).

That day of 19th July 2000, witnessed different approaches of pressure administered on the Palestinian delegation to make them accept the offer; President Clinton started exerting pressure on Arafat by threatening to personally abandon the peace effort in the Middle East (Hanieh, 2000, P. 25).

Also Clinton had different Arab leaders, such as King Abdulla of Saudi Arabia, President Ben Ali of Tunisia, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdulla II of Jordan, talk to Arafat in order to convince him to sign an agreement (Kanafani, 2007, P.422).

Furthermore, the US Team promised the Palestinian delegation a financial incentive, stating that Clinton could ask the G-8 countries for a big financial aid package to the Palestinians. Although the Palestinian delegation welcomed the financial incentive given to the Palestinians, it declined agreeing to the concessions demanded (Hanieh, 2000,P. 26).

So before the US President left for the summit, he suggested that the delegations wait for him few days and remained at Camp David with Ms. Albright and the US Team trying to salvage the mediations.

During those four days, Ms. Albright conducted many meetings with the delegations, without success. And after two days Ms. Albright announced that the Israeli offer is no longer on the table to which the Israeli and the Palestinian delegations were relieved, this relief was due to the Israeli opposition in Israel who was using the Israeli concessions in the offer to break Barak’s coalition. Also the Palestinian delegation was relived because they were no longer pressured to accept the offer. According to Palestinian negotiators, it was a time to reflect (Hanieh, 2000, P. 30).

When Clinton was back to Camp David, he was keen on reviving the Peace Talks. He met with Arafat and Barak, in addition to having marathon negotiations, discussing the disputed issues and trying to reframe the Israeli offer but was unfruitful in making peace.

On the 25th of July 2000, Camp David 2 – 2000 has come to an end. US President Bill Clinton went to the White House to the press conference to announce the failure of Camp David 2-2000 (Clinton, 2004, P. 914).

It is crucial to state that at Camp David 2 – 2000, the US administration did not allow the press to enter the resort or cover the negotiations, but many well known analysts who studied the accounts of the negotiators concluded one of the two; the first conclusion was that the Palestinians had a hidden agenda that revolves around eliminating Israel such as Benny Morris (Morris, 2002) and Jeremy Pressman (Pressman, 2003) who stated that if the right of return for the Palestinian refugees was accepted by the Israeli delegation, the Palestinians would become a majority and the Israelis a minority, translating into the death of Israel.

The second conclusion was that the Israelis and the US team deliberately focused on the Israeli demands and the Palestinian concessions, and overlooked the rights of the Palestinian people such as Marwan Kanafani (Kanafani, 2007) and Akram Hanieh (Hanieh, 2000) who stated that the elements of the Israeli offer at Camp David on the security, territory, and Jerusalem would have prevented the emergence of a sovereign, contiguous Palestinian state.

The contradiction of the two schools of thought reflect the distrust, anger and resentment the delegations felt for the other at the negotiations. In addition to revealing how each delegation received the other party's demands, particularly the breakdown of the Israeli offer.

2.5 The Israeli Offer at Camp David 2-2000

On the 25th July, 2000 President Bill Clinton admired Barak at the Press Conference, for his courageous steps towards the attempt of resolving the conflict and reaching settlement. President Clinton also mentioned the far-reaching Israeli Offer and the response of Arafat towards that offer. He then blamed Arafat for not taking the steps necessary to resolve the conflict and accept the comprehensive offer (Clinton, 2004, P. 912).

As mentioned earlier, the Israeli offer was orally conveyed; there is no written offer that is known for all sides, in addition to fact that different negotiators have different perceptions of that offer.

Hereunder is the basic Israeli package as understood from different resources.

1. Israel would agree to a demilitarized Palestinian state in the entire Gaza Strip and in 82-92 % of the West Bank (Roy, 2002, P. 10).
2. Israel would return to its pre-1967 borders with minor exceptions. These exceptions are the illegal settlements of the West Bank being annexed to Israel in areas immediately contiguous to Jerusalem, in exchange for territories in the Negev desert being annexed to Palestine (Pressman, 2003, P. 30).
3. Barak promised that there would be no expansion or creation of new settlements.
4. Israel presented three basic proposals for handling the issue of Jerusalem, particularly East Jerusalem.
    a. In the first option regarding the religious places, Palestinians would be given sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City, while Israel would retain sovereignty over the Jewish and Armenian quarters. Additionally, mixed sovereignty would be established over the Temple Mount (Al Haram al Sharif) where the Palestinians have sovereignty over the land, while the Israelis have sovereignty under the ground. Under this arrangement, Jerusalem would ultimately become the shared capital of both states.
    b. In the second option, Palestinian sovereignty over several Arab neighborhoods surrounding the Old City would be established, while only administrative autonomy would be granted within the walls of the Old City.
    c. Finally, in the third option, the issue of Jerusalem would be deferred until later.

5. The Israeli Prime Minister would not acknowledge that Israel bore any moral or historical responsibility for the creation of the refugees problem, nor would he consider distinguishing between the principle and the practical implementation of any Palestinian refugees rights. The Israeli offer talks about allowing roughly ten thousand to return to Israel as part of a reunification program, not because of an acknowledged Palestinian right, but rather as an Israeli gesture (Roy, 2002, P. 11).
6. Barak was committed to continue Israeli settlements, early warning stations, military bases, and patrols in designated areas of the Jordan River Valley to maintain Israel's security. Barak specified that this would be maintained for a period of six to twelve years, after which time it would be reevaluated (Roy, 2002, P. 12).
7. Barak proposed that Israel and the Palestinians cooperate on expanding the water resources for both states, principally through desalination. It should be noted, however, that most of the existing water aquifers were located within the eight to nine percent of the West Bank that was to be annexed by Israel (Hanieh, 2000, P. 18).

When the Palestinian delegation received this offer, their response came quick. The rejection of this package was to be expected since the basic demands of the Palestinians were not evident in this offer. Applying the different UN Resolutions was not witnessed at the offer, among other issues; Palestinians wanted full sovereignty over pre-1967 borders, while Israelis wanted to grant sovereignty over modified pre-1967 borders. And the Palestinians wanted full sovereignty over the Temple Mount, but

Israelis were only prepared to grant them administrative control of this area. Also, the Palestinians wanted Israel to take responsibility for the refugees’ problem and to allow more to return to the PNA. Furthermore, Palestinians and Israelis faced intra-party and inter-party disruption over the issue of fragmenting Jerusalem.

2.6 The U.S Team as a Mediator at Camp David 2-2000

The US Team was headed by President Bill Clinton who was the mediator between the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. Clinton had to mediate between the two leaders while other US mediators at the team such as Sandy Burger, Gemal Helal, John Podesta, Dennis Ross, and Madeline Albright dealt with other Israeli and Palestinian counterparts (Clinton, 2004, P. 912).

In their article ‘Camp David: Tragedy of Errors’ Robert Malley, who participated in the Camp David summit as President Bill Clinton’s special assistant for Arab-Israeli affairs at the National Security Council, and Hussein Agha, an editor of the Palestinian Studies Journal, with close ties to the Palestinian negotiators, remarked that “The United States had several different roles in the negotiations, complex and often contradictory: as principal broker of the putative peace deal; as guardian of the peace process; as Israel’s strategic ally; and as its cultural and political partner.” (Agha and Malley, 2001, P.11).

Those roles were surely few of the roles played by the US administration at Camp David 2 – 2000 but certainly not all of them; nevertheless, US mediators were active in every aspect of the mediation.

During Camp David 2–2000, the US mediator had many responsibilities such as creating a comfortable environment for the parties to feel at ease with, to bring the parties closer, educating the parties of how to tackle the negotiated issues, building trust, exchanging ideas and notes between the parties, pressuring and inducing the parties to act in a way that would lead them to reach agreement, presenting offers and ideas, and framing and reframing the offer at hand. Thus, the US mediator had many roles at Camp David 2 –

2000 and those were a facilitator, formulator or messenger, educator, manipulator and intervener.

Given that Camp David 2–2000 took place during the month of July the year 2000, the US President only had six months before the end of his Presidency term. Bill Clinton was time pressured during Camp David 2 - 2000 and this could have produced faults during the Peace Talk.

Since the US mediator was time pressured, the allegation of the Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat of not having enough time to properly prepare for the Peace Talk could be valid. Moreover, the conduct of the US President could be tremulous due to Clinton's preoccupation with his ending presidency term. Furthermore, Clinton pushed for Camp David 2-2000 as way to redeem his acts as the US President, in which he had many faults such as the well-known scandal of the Lewinsky Affair.

In his book 'My Life', Bill Clinton stated that he argued Ehud Barak when the later asked him to present the Israeli offer as his own; also he mentioned to Barak that he would not do it and was agitated by this incident. Another incident that took place at Camp David 2 – 2000 that support the belief of him being time pressured and stressed-out, was his frustration and little endurance of Yasser Arafat, when the later refused to accept the offer or even make a counter-offer (Clinton, 2004, P. 914).

Furthermore, the US president blamed the Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat for the failure of Camp David 2 – 2000, instead of taking the blame and being an escape-goat for the future of the Peace Talks and the conflict. This ensured that his ending presidency cycle would not be stained with failure, although he promised Arafat during the pre-

negotiations that there will be no finger pointing in case of the failure (Shlaim, 2009, P. 216).

Another point that has to be addressed is the manipulation and the pressure that the US President administered on the Palestinian delegation particularly Yasser Arafat.

The mediator is entitled to pressure the parties into reaching settlement. However, Clinton's conduct went far with pressuring and threatening the Palestinian delegation, with no pressure being seen exerted on the Israeli delegation. Furthermore, the US President's speech at the White House after the end of Camp David 2-2000 came sharp and bias towards the Israelis.

The US Lobby is known to be an influential organization that affects the US foreign policy and also the conduct of the US administration. 'The Israeli Lobby' book talks about the organization and its conduct. It also explains the limitation of the US administration in the face of this organization (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, P. 10).

The Palestinian delegation suspected a US-Israeli conspiracy to pressure the Palestinian into agreeing to an unfair agreement. Was there a conspiracy? This question unfortunately cannot be answered since the Palestinian delegation did not present a counter-offer and instead chose to refuse and withdraw.

On the other hand, President Bill Clinton had a special relationship with Yasser Arafat, due to many reasons; First, Bill Clinton gave a lot of attention and effort throughout his presidency cycle which consisted of eight years, for the sake of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Second, Yasser Arafat is one of the few leaders who had the most number of visits to the White House during the Clinton Presidency Cycle. Third, Clinton's

personality and charisma allowed him to evolve a working relationship with Yasser Arafat. Those reasons made it possible to have a good relationship between the leader of the Palestinian People and the President of the US.

As mentioned earlier, the US President has many exquisite skills as a mediator; he developed a good friendship with Arafat given the number of visits Arafat made to the White House, in addition to that the US has been an Israeli ally since the birth of Israel, this contradiction reflect the multi-tasking Clinton can handle.

Clinton's personality, charisma and knowledge were crucial to Camp David 2 – 2000. At the negotiations, the US President used to manifest his appreciation and respect to the Palestinians through many acts such as, walking with Arafat to his residence after the meetings, allowing Arafat to enter through the door first and giving the Palestinian Chairman a pat on the shoulder.

Clinton played a central role at Camp David 2 – 2000 which is evident in the delay of the mediations following his departure to the G-8 summit until he returned after few days.

Conclusion

3. Knowing the Variables

In the first chapter the pre process variables were carefully examined including analyzing the complex nature of the conflict, the relative power of the parties, the parties position, the relationships between the parties, the US mediator position and motives prior to the Camp David 2-2000 talks. The effects of these variables were analyzed to understand the most important variables that led to the failure of Camp David 2-2000. In addition, several process variables were also examined including: the Israeli and Palestinian motives, the US role and motives, the negotiations on the disputed issues and the relationship between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations.

This chapter presents the results of analysis and identifies the key variables that are the direct cause for the failure of Camp David 2-2000. In addition, this chapter examines the secondary variables that along with the key variables paved the way for the failure of Camp David 2-2000.

3.1 The Key Pre-process and Process Variables that Led to the Failure of Camp David 2-2000

The significance of the key variables is uneven. The impacts of each variable on the outcome of negotiations of Camp David 2-2000 are difficult to measure; however, these impacts are relatively evaluated.

The nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the parties' position on the disputed issues is the most important decisive key variable that negatively impacted the negotiations at Camp David 2-2000 and led to its failure. The positions and views of both parties regarding the most sensitive and key issues were very different including the positions on Jerusalem and the holy places, the refugees, and delineating of borders. The parties were not ready to make compromises on their position, and therefore were not able to reach agreement.

The second key variable is the Relative Power of the Parties including the leadership of the negotiating parties, unequal negotiation skills, and parties' power imbalance.

On leadership, it was clear that the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had insufficient political experience which reflected on his conduct at Camp David 2-2000 in a number of ways. First Barak pushed hard to fast track the Camp David 2-2000 talks and ignored the Palestinian reservations and not allowing adequate time to prepare for Camp David 2-2000 talks. Second, Prime Minister Barak rushed to Camp David 2-2000 talks at a critical time to keep his coalition in power. Some analysts attributed Barak's motives of moving quickly to Camp David 2-2000 as a way to hold his chaotic coalition (Goldenberg, 2000). Third, Barak used his almost ending prime ministry term as a way to pressure the Palestinians at Camp David 2-2000 to give concessions. Fourth, Barak believed that the US mediator will be able to put pressure and force Arafat into signing an agreement at Camp David 2-2000.

On the other side, the Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat with many years in power carried the responsibility of representing the Palestinians, Arabs and the Muslim World at Camp David 2-2000 to bring back the Palestinian lands and retrieve the Palestinian rights.

An important attribute of the Relative Power of the Parties is the imbalance of power which has set the grounds for Israel, the powerful party, to have control of the negotiations and be in a position to present the Palestinians with offers that they considered unfair and therefore were rejected. The attributes of this key variable Relative Power of the Parties collectively gave reason for this variable to be considered as the second key variable which led to the failure of Camp David 2-2000.

The third key variable is the US mediator and its motives. This variable came out as a key in the pre-process and the process clusters. As a pre-process variable, the US mediator had several strong factors supporting its position: the leverage of the US administration over the two parties, the good relationship that President Bill Clinton had with both Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Chairman Yasser Arafat, and the exerted effort and the demonstrated focus of the US administration to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite the US mediator leverage over the parties, this variable had negative aspects related to the biased inclination of the US mediator towards Israel, and the timing of Camp David 2-2000 talks which coincided with ending the presidency cycle of President Bill Clinton.

During the talks, and as part of the process variables, the role of the US mediator had been viewed negatively in different aspects. The President's conduct and presence throughout the mediations of Camp David 2-2000 was crucial. This was evident when the President left for the G8 summit, causing a pause to the talks. In addition President Clinton was motivated by his own personal interest to reach a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and end his term with a historic achievement that overshadows misconducts and improves his image.

3.2 The Secondary Variables that Led to the Failure of Camp David 2-2000

This section analyzes the secondary variables that along with the key variables have led to the failure of Camp David 2000.

The first secondary variable that had an impact on the outcome of Camp David 2-2000 is the timing of Camp David 2-2000. This secondary variable surfaced many times as it correlates with various key variables that negatively affected outcome of Camp David 2-2000. The ending presidency cycle of Bill Clinton (as part of the US mediator and its motives variable), and the insufficient political experience of Premier Barak (as part of the relatives power of the parties variable) are two factors that determined the timing of the mediation.

Furthermore, the ending term of Ehud Barak in addition to his shaky coalition were also factors which rushed the process without giving enough time to prepare thoroughly for the negotiations.

The relationships of the parties is another secondary variable that negatively affected the outcome of Camp David talks. Both Arafat and Barak had limited direct working relationship prior to the talks. Premier Barak personality, military background and nurture, and narrow diplomatic skills did not help developing a working relationship with Arafat, and rebuild the trust that was severely weakened during the preparation phase. These variables framed the positions of the parties around the negotiations table and grossly affected the negotiations approaches and modalities. The Israelis approach of presenting their offer is the third secondary variable, when Barak verbally presented his offer to

Arafat, motivated by fear and mistrust that Arafat would pocket a written offer for the next round of negotiations without providing concessions on his side. In return Arafat rejected the verbal offer and did not present a counter offer.

As a final note the above mentioned variables negatively impacted the outcome of Camp David 2-2000 individually and collectively and led to its failure. However, the correlation between those variables has magnified the variables' effect.

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المفاوضات الإسرائيلية – الفلسطينية في كامب ديفيد ٢-٢٠٠٠:

تحليل نقدي

إعداد:

رابية البرقان

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الملخص

قامت الادارة الامريكية بالوساطة بين الاسرائيليين و الفاسطينيين في كامب ديفيد في أمريكا في شهر تموز من عام ٢٠٠٠ لفض النزاع القائم بين اسرائيل والفلسطينين، حيث استمرت جهود الوساطة والمفاوضات لمدة أسبوعين من دون التوصل الى إتفاق. هذا وقد تم اعتماد نهج الطوارئ (Contingency Approach) كأسلوب لتحليل محادثات الوساطة كامب ديفيد ٢-٢٠٠٠ بشكل نقدي.

من خلال النهج المستخدم تم التوصل الى عدد من المتغيرات مرتبطة بمجموعات ما قبل مفاوضات كامب ديفيد ٢-٢٠٠٠، خلالها وبعدها، ومن هذه المتغيرات: العلاقات بين المتنازعين، القوة النسبية للأطراف، الوسيط الأمريكي ودوافعه، طبيعة النزاع وتوقيت الوساطة.

لقد تمت دراسة وتحليل هذه المتغيرات من أجل تحديد الأسباب التي أدت الى فشل كامب ديفيد ٢-٢٠٠٠، حيث تم التعرف على المتغيرات التي أثرت سلباً على عملية الوساطة. بالإضافة الى هذا تم حصر المتغيرات الرئيسة التي كانت السبب في فشل المحادثات.

المتغيرات الرئيسة التي أدت الى فشل كامب ديفيد ٢-٢٠٠٠ الى جانب طبيعة النزاع والقضايا المعقدة المرتبطة بالأطراف كانت: القوى النسبية للأطراف المتنازعة وخصوصاً قلة الخبرة السياسية التي يتمتع بها باراك واندفاعه الزائد، والوسيط الأمريكي ودوافعه التي تتمثل بنهاية الفترة الرئاسية لكلينتون وبالتالي عدم إيلاء الوقت الكافي للتحضير للمحادثات.

أما بالنسبة للمتغيرات الثانوية فقد كانت ثلاثة متغيرات: المتغير الثانوي الأول هو توقيت المحادثات، حيث قامت المتغيرات الرئيسة بالتداخل مع هذا المتغير ليؤثر سلبياً على محادثات كامب ديفيد ٢-٢٠٠٠. بالإضافة الى هذا، فإن متغير التوقيت قد أثر على مرحلة ما قبل العملية (pre- process stage) بأن ولّدت حالة من عدم الثقة بين الأطراف، الأمر الذي دفع بالعلاقات بين الأطراف لأن يكون المتغير الثانوي الثاني.

المتغير الثانوي الثالث هو العرض الإسرائيلي. أيضاً كان من نتاج المتغيرات الثانوية السابقة، حيث أن العلاقات السلبية بين الأطراف أثرت على كيفية التعاطي بين الأطراف خلال المفاوضات، فقد قام باراك بتقديم العرض الإسرائيلي على الفلسطينين شفهياً دلالة على عدم ثقة باراك بالطرف الفلسطيني وبالتالي رفض عرفات العرض وامتنع عن تقديم أية عروض للطرف الإسرائيلي ليس بسبب العرض الشفهي فحسب بل بسبب قلة الثقة بالطرف الإسرائيلي والمفاوضات في كامب ديفيد ٢-٢٠٠٠ ككل.